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*NOTE: On July 21, 2014, Timothy J. Donohue, President of the American Society for Microbiology, and Ronald M. Atlas, Chair of the Public and Scientific 
Affairs Board of the ASM, sent to all ASM members a letter [http://www.asm.org/index.php/public-policy/93-policy/93014-biosafety-7-14] concerning the 
recent events at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), which are documented in the CDC Report 
issued on July 11, 2014, that International Microbiology reproduces here (the original can be accessed through the following link [http://www.cdc.gov/od/
science/integrity/docs/Final_Anthrax_Report.pdf]). On July 31, Donahue and Atlas sent a second letter [http://www.asm.org/index.php/clinical-microbiology-
update/137-policy/documents/statements-and-testimony/93024-durc-7-31-14] stating that “The ASM has a long history of supporting and informing public 
policy that is based on the essential principle of ensuring protection of public health and safety without unduly encumbering legitimate fundamental scientific 
research, clinical and diagnostic testing for the treatment and prevention of infectious diseases. The ASM has and continues to have a position that microbio-
logical research must be done safely and in accordance with regulations governing the proper conduct of that research.” They also referred to the research for 
the treatment, control and prevention of infectious diseases, which is crucial and require the utilization of pathogenic material as well as laboratory safety and 
security measures. To provide microbiologists with background information on this topic, Donohue and Atlas informed that “The ASM has also prepared a 
history of issues and policy related to biological research with select agents and toxins, high containment laboratories, dual use research of concern and gain-
of-function (GOF) research. This document is posted on the ASM website at [http://www.asm.org/images/PSAB/History-SelectAgents.pdf].”
Executive Summary 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) con-
ducted an internal review of an incident that involved an unin-
tentional release of potentially viable anthrax within its 
Roybal Campus, in Atlanta, Georgia. On June 5, 2014, a labo-
ratory scientist in the Bioterrorism Rapid Response and Ad-
vanced Technology (BRRAT) laboratory prepared extracts 
from a panel of eight bacterial select agents, including Bacillus 
anthracis (B. anthracis), under biosafety level (BSL) 3 con-
tainment conditions. These samples were being prepared for 
analysis using matrix-assisted laser desorption/ionization time-
of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spectrometry, a technology that 
can be used for rapid bacterial species identification. 
What Happened 
This protein extraction procedure was being evaluated as part 
of a preliminary assessment of whether MALDI-TOF mass 
spectrometry could provide a faster way to detect anthrax 
compared to conventional methods and could be utilized by 
emergency response laboratories. After chemical treatment 
for 10 minutes and extraction, the samples were checked for 
sterility by plating portions of them on bacterial growth me-
dia. When no growth was observed on sterility plates after 24 
hours, the remaining samples, which had been held in the che-
mical solution for 24 hours, were moved to CDC BSL-2 labo-
ratories. On June 13, 2014, a laboratory scientist in the BR-
RAT laboratory BSL-3 lab observed unexpected growth on 
the anthrax sterility plate. While the specimens plated on this 
plate had only been treated for 10 minutes as opposed to the 
24 hours of treatment of specimens sent outside of the BSL-3 
lab, this nonetheless indicated that the B. anthracis sample 
extract may not have been sterile when transferred to BSL-2 
laboratories. 
Why the Incident Happened 
The overriding factor contributing to this incident was the 
lack of an approved, written study plan reviewed by senior 
staff or scientific leadership to ensure that the research design 
was appropriate and met all laboratory safety requirements.
Several additional factors contributed to the incident: 
• Use of unapproved sterilization techniques 
• Transfer of material not confirmed to be inactive 
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• Use of pathogenic B. anthracis when non-pathogenic 
strains would have been appropriate for this experiment 
• Inadequate knowledge of the peer-reviewed literature 
• Lack of a standard operating procedure or process on 
inactivation and transfer to cover all procedures done with 
select agents in the BRRAT laboratory. 
What Has CDC Done Since the Incident 
Occurred 
CDC’s initial response to the incident focused on ensuring 
that any potentially exposed staff were assessed and, if appro-
priate, provided preventive treatment to reduce the risk of 
illness if exposure had occurred. CDC also ceased operations 
of the BRRAT laboratory pending investigation, decontami-
nated potentially affected laboratory spaces, undertook rese-
arch to refine understanding of potential exposures and opti-
mize preventive treatment, and conducted a review of the 
event to identify key recommendations. 
To evaluate potential risk, research studies were conduc-
ted at a CDC laboratory and at an external laboratory to eva-
luate the extent to which the chemical treatment used by the 
BRRAT laboratory inactivated B. anthracis. Two preparations 
were evaluated: vegetative cells and a high concentration of 
B. anthracis spores. Results indicated that this treatment was 
effective at inactivating vegetative cells of B. anthracis under 
the conditions tested. The treatment was also effective at inac-
tivating a high percentage of, but not all B. anthracis spores 
from the concentrated spore preparation. 
A moratorium is being put into effect on July 11, 2014, on 
any biological material leaving any CDC BSL-3 or BSL-4 
laboratory in order to allow sufficient time to put adequate 
improvement measures in place.
 
What’s Next 
Since the incident, CDC has put in place multiple steps to redu-
ce the risk of a similar event happening in the future. Key re-
commendations will address the root causes of this incident and 
provide redundant safeguards across the agency, these include: 
• The BRRAT laboratory has been closed since June 16, 
2014, and will remain closed as it relates to work with any 
select agent until certain specific actions are taken 
• Appropriate personnel action will be taken with respect 
to individuals who contributed to or were in a position to 
prevent this incident 
• Protocols for inactivation and transfer of virulent patho-
gens throughout CDC laboratories will be reviewed 
• CDC will establish a CDC-wide single point of accoun-
tability for laboratory safety 
• CDC will establish an external advisory committee to 
provide ongoing advice and direction for laboratory safety 
• CDC response to future internal incidents will be impro-
ved by rapid establishment of an incident command struc-
ture 
• Broader implications for the use of select agents, across 
the United States will be examined. 
This was a serious event that should not have happened. 
Though it now appears that the risk to any individual was eit-
her non-existent or very small, the issues raised by this event 
are important. CDC has concrete actions underway now to 
change processes that allowed this to happen, and we will do 
everything possible to prevent a future occurrence such as this 
in any CDC laboratory, and to apply the lessons learned to 
other laboratories across the United States. 
Background 
This report reviews circumstances leading to June 2014 inci-
dent in which CDC staff members were potentially exposed to 
viable Bacillus anthracis. The incident occurred after B. anthracis 
extract was transferred from CDC’s Bioterrorism Rapid Res-
ponse and Advanced Technology (BRRAT) biosafety level 
(BSL) 3 laboratory to BSL-2 laboratories without proper as-
surance that the extract did not contain viable cells or spores. 
This is not the first time an event of this nature has occur-
red at CDC, nor the first time it occurred from the BRRAT 
laboratory. At the time of this writing, CDC is aware of four 
other such incidents in the past decade. In a prior incident in 
2006, CDC’s BRRAT laboratory transferred vials of anthrax 
DNA to the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory 
(LLNL) and a private laboratory. The BRRAT laboratory be-
lieved that they had inactivated the samples, but upon receipt 
and testing of the samples at LLNL, viable B. anthracis was 
detected. The BRRAT laboratory implemented new quality 
assurance procedures to ensure non-viability of DNA prepara-
tions of select agents and developed policies that require the 
signature of the laboratory’s principal investigator prior to 
shipping or transferring DNA derived from bacterial select 
agents. These procedures were not followed in the current in-
cident, which did not specifically involve preparation of DNA 
for transfer. Also in 2006, DNA preparations shipped from 
another CDC laboratory were found to contain live Clostridium 
botulinum due to the use of inadequate inactivation procedu-
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res. In 2009, newly available test methods showed that a strain 
of Brucella, thought to have been an attenuated vaccine strain 
and previously shipped to LRN laboratories as early as 2001, 
was not the vaccine strain. The vaccine strain is not conside-
red to be a select agent, while the strain that was actually ship-
ped is a select agent. 
As this report was being finalized, CDC leadership was 
made aware that earlier this year a culture of low-pathogenic 
avian influenza was unintentionally cross-contaminated at a 
CDC influenza laboratory with a highly pathogenic H5N1 
strain of influenza and shipped to a BSL-3, select-agent labo-
ratory operated by the United States Department of Agricultu-
re (USDA). The CDC influenza laboratory where this incident 
occurred is now closed and will not reopen until adequate im-
provements are put in place. Although CDC is continuing to 
investigate and review this matter, Attachment A provides 
current information on the incident and the agency’s response. 
Effective, validated inactivation protocols for B. anthracis 
have been published. Cultures of B. anthracis cells and spores 
can be completely inactivated through established protocols 
using heat (e.g., boiling for 10 minutes or autoclaving for 15 
minutes), irradiation (1 million rad), or various chemical treat-
ments (e.g., hydrogen peroxide, peracetic acid, formalin, or 
gaseous ethylene oxide). In general, longer treatment times 
and/or higher concentrations are required for inactivation of 
spores compared to inactivation of viable cells. Solutions can 
also be sterilized by filtration, through a 0.1 micron filter, to 
remove viable cells and spores. 
Space decontamination can be achieved through one of 
two approved liquid decontamination methods and one vapor 
method. A solution of freshly made dilution of household bleach 
(10% bleach by volume), pH adjusted to 7.0 with acetic acid, 
is recognized by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
to kill B. anthracis spores with a minimum contact time of 10 
minutes. The EPA also registered the use of Spor-Klenz® 
(STERIS®) as a sterilant, as a 1:99 water dilution of the con-
centration is effective as a sporocide with a minimum contact 
time of 30 minutes. Vapor phase hydrogen peroxide is also 
available at CDC as a room disinfectant. 
Laboratories 
CDC laboratories conduct research that is critical to better de-
tect, respond to, and prevent disease and bioterrorism. Rese-
arch done in CDC laboratories helps identify better ways to 
detect these infectious agents rapidly. The Laboratory Res-
ponse Network (LRN) is a network of laboratories that can 
respond to biological and chemical threats and other public 
health emergencies. It includes state and local public health, 
veterinary, military, and international labs. The BRRAT labo-
ratory provides technical and scientific support for the appro-
ximately 150 laboratories in the LRN. The BRRAT laboratory 
contains both BSL-3 and BSL-2 labs and was established in 
1999 in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 39, 
which outlined national anti-terrorism policies and assigned 
specific missions to federal departments and agencies (http://
www.bt.cdc.gov/lrn/). The BRRAT laboratory provides qua-
lity assurance for the specialized reagents used in the LRN 
and has performed studies with the goal of improving the per-
formance and reliability of tests used to detect biological thre-
at agents. Bacillus anthracis is of particular concern because 
it can and has been used as a weapon. 
Two CDC laboratories received the extracts prepared by 
the BRATT laboratory BSL-3 laboratory: the Bacterial Special 
Pathogens Branch laboratory (BSPB laboratory); and the Bi-
otechnology Core Facility Branch (BCFB laboratory). 
Methods Used in Reviewing this Incident 
A CDC team of scientists and leaders interviewed laboratory 
scientists involved directly with the incident and others who 
had specific knowledge of the incident and of immediate res-
ponse activities. Each interview consisted of a standardized set 
of questions, as well as specific questions based on an indivi-
dual’s role and responsibilities. Standard operating procedures 
(SOPs), protocols, and training records were also reviewed. 
Description of the Event
 
The BRRAT laboratory was evaluating matrix-assisted laser 
desorption/ionization time-of-flight (MALDI-TOF) mass spec-
trometry, which can identify bacteria by bacterial protein “fin-
gerprints.” It is faster and less expensive than conventional 
species-identification methods, which require culture of orga-
nisms on selective bacterial media or extraction and characteri-
zation of bacterial nucleic acids. The project was a collaborati-
on among the BRRAT, BSPB, and BCFB laboratories. The re-
searchers intended to use the data collected to submit a joint 
proposal to CDC’s Office of Public Health Preparedness and 
Response to fund further evaluation of the MALDI-TOF met-
hod because MALDI-TOF is increasingly being used by clini-
cal and hospital laboratories for infectious disease diagnostics. 
On June 2, 2014, the BRRAT laboratory supervisor con-
tacted a subject matter expert who had successfully used this 
technology to identify three pathogenic species of Brucella. 
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In response to the BRRAT laboratory supervisor’s request for 
assistance and advice, a BSPB laboratory supervisor offered 
to share the methodology, results, and inactivated bacterial 
preparations used by the BSPB laboratory in their work with 
Brucella. The BSPB laboratory had modified the MALDI-
TOF equipment manufacturer’s sample preparation protocol 
to optimize the results for bacterial protein sample extractions 
of Brucella. In this extraction procedure, each organism is tre-
ated with ethanol, then with 70% formic acid for 10 minutes, 
followed by the addition of 100% acetonitrile, and then is in-
cubated at room temperature. The method used by the BSPB 
laboratory also incorporated a sterility check of the extract 
after 10 minutes of incubation in the extraction solution. Spe-
cifically, an aliquot of the extract was spread on an agar plate, 
incubated for 48 hours, and then examined for growth. If no 
growth was visible, the extract was considered to be sterile 
and could be safely transferred from the BSL-3 laboratory to 
a BSL-2 laboratory for processing for use in the MALDI-TOF 
equipment. 
The BSPB laboratory protocol did not call for filtration of 
the bacterial extract prior to transfer from the BSL-3 labora-
tory because it had been determined that the extraction proce-
dure inactivated the three species of Brucella tested. It is im-
portant to note that, unlike B. anthracis, Brucella does not 
form spores. Bacterial spores are relatively resistant to harsh 
conditions, such as the chemicals used in this extraction pro-
cedure, and are more difficult to kill than vegetative cells. As 
a result, additional procedures (e.g., filtration) can be used 
when working with spore-forming bacteria, such as B. anthra-
cis, to ensure specimens are rendered non-viable. 
The BRRAT laboratory supervisor instructed a laboratory 
scientist to obtain the written protocol for sample preparation 
from BSPB laboratory. The BSPB laboratory provided a sam-
ple preparation protocol, which did not include a viability 
SOP. The supervisor requested that virulent strains of eight 
select agents, including B. anthracis, be used for the initial 
experiment. On June 5, 2014, the laboratory scientist follo-
wed the modified protocol to prepare eight individual orga-
nism extracts for use in the MALDI-TOF. Another scientist in 
the BRRAT laboratory raised the question of whether filtration 
of the extracts might affect the MALDI-TOF results. To an-
swer this question the laboratory scientist split each extract 
into two aliquots and filtered one aliquot through a 0.1 micron 
filter. After a 10 minute incubation period, filtered and unfilte-
red extracts were then plated onto agar and incubated for 24 
hours to check the extracts for sterility. The decision to incu-
bate for 24 hours, rather than 48 hours (as recommended by 
the BSPB staff member) was made by the first laboratory 
scientist based on the individual’s own understanding of in-
formation conveyed by the laboratory scientist in the BSPB 
laboratory during a telephone discussion of the protocol. 
All work was performed in a biological safety cabinet in 
the BRRAT BSL-3 laboratory with both BRRAT laboratory 
scientists present. The first laboratory scientist was primarily 
involved in performing the extraction, and the second was 
there to observe and learn the procedure. Both were jointly 
involved in filtering material, plating onto media, and reading 
sterility plates at 24 hours. After 24 hours of incubation, they 
observed no growth on any of the 16 sterility plates that had 
been prepared after 10 minutes of formic acid treatment. The 
first laboratory scientist planned to autoclave the plates, then 
discard them; however, the individual had difficulty opening 
the autoclave door. As a result, the plates were returned to the 
incubator and left for 7 additional days. 
The first laboratory scientist moved the extracts from the 
BRRAT laboratory BSL-3 lab to an adjoining BSL-2 labora-
tory that is also part of the BRRAT laboratory. At this point, 
the protein extracts had been held in the formic acid/acetoni-
trile solution for 24 hours. The first laboratory scientist then 
continued with the process of preparing the material for 
analysis by MALDI-TOF, and then moved preparations or ali-
quots of the protein extracts made from the BRRAT’s BSL-2 
laboratory to the BSPB and BCFB laboratories on three sepa-
rate days: June 6, June 11, and/or June 12, 2014. 
On June 13, 2014, the second BRRAT laboratory scientist 
removed the sterility testing plates after 8 days in the BSL-3 
incubator for autoclaving and disposal and discovered growth 
on the sterility plate that had been plated with unfilter ed 
B. anthracis. The growth was confirmed as B. anthracis by 
real-time polymerase chain reaction using the LRN B. anthra-
cis identification assays. It is not known at what point after the 
initial 24 hour incubation period that growth occurred. If the 
plates had been autoclaved after 24 hours, as planned, the 
event would not have been discovered. 
The incident was immediately reported to the CDC Select 
Agent Program Responsible Official within CDC’s Environment, 
Safety and Health Compliance Office (ESHCO) and DSAT. 
CDC personnel decontaminated the affected rooms using 
the liquid decontamination methods described above (see 
Background). Laboratory floors, benchtops, equipment, and 
other affected areas (e.g., room door handles) were deconta-
minated as part of this process. Two potentially affected refri-
gerators were moved to a secure BSL-3 facility and deconta-
minated using vapor phase hydrogen peroxide. Rooms will 
remain closed until the procedures have been validated as 
EPA compliant by an external safety expert. 
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After the incident was discovered, two laboratory studies 
were undertaken to determine if the formic acid and acetoni-
trile treatment was effective at inactivating laboratory speci-
mens of B. anthracis: one at CDC and one at an independent 
LRN laboratory at the Michigan Department of Community 
Health (MDCH). The CDC study evaluated the effect of treat-
ment exposure times of 10 minutes in formic acid and after 6 
hours and 24 hours in formic acid/acetonitrile on B. anthracis 
vegetative cells. In addition, the CDC study evaluated treat-
ment exposure times of 10 minutes in formic acid and 24 
hours in formic acid/acetonitrile using high-concentrations of 
B. anthracis spores. Cultures from treated cells and spores 
were monitored daily for viability for up to 8 days post-treat-
ment. The MDCH study independently evaluated the efficacy 
of the formic acid/acetonitrile treatment on B. anthracis vege-
tative cells. This study used samples that were taken at three 
different time points: immediately on addition of the formic 
acid and subsequently at 1 hour and 24 hours post-treatment. 
The MDCH cultures were monitored for up to 8 days for via-
bility. 
Findings from both the CDC internal study and the MDCH 
indicate that the formic acid and formic acid/acetonitrile treat-
ment were effective at inactivating vegetative cells of B. anth-
racis. No viable material was recovered from formic acid and 
formic acid/acetonitrile treated cells. These findings were 
consistent for the 8-day study duration. The formic acid and 
formic acid/acetonitrile treatments were effective at inactiva-
ting a high percentage, but not all, B. anthracis spores. From 
a starting suspension of 50,000 B. anthracis spores (500,000 
per milliliter), which had been treated for 24 hours with the 
extraction process, there were a total of four colony forming 
units of growth in the 8-day study period. 
Based on review of all aspects of the incident, it appears 
that while exposure of staff to viable B. anthracis was not 
impossible, it is extremely unlikely that this occurred. All or 
the great majority of B. anthracis cells and spores in the sam-
ple would have been inactivated by the 24-hour treatment 
(versus the 10 minute sample which grew anthrax at some 
point between day 2 and day 8 of incubation). 
Findings 
Incident-related Findings
The overriding factor contributing to this incident was the 
lack of an approved, written study plan reviewed by CDC 
senior staff, such as laboratory, branch, or division scien-
tific leadership, to ensure that the research design was ap-
propriate and met all laboratory safety requirements. The 
first BRRAT laboratory scientist was trained to work in the 
BSL-3 environment, including training in pathogen-specific 
procedures for the work normally performed. However, the 
individual had not performed this specific procedure with pat-
hogenic select agents (the procedure was new to the labora-
tory) and should not have been instructed to proceed without 
submitting a complete protocol for review and approval. Furt-
her, a written protocol to certify the sterility of material to be 
transferred to BSL-2 laboratories was not in place, and the 
BSL-2 laboratories did not have an SOP that required receipt 
of written certification of non-viability for transfers prior to 
acceptance of microbiologic material. There was also inade-
quate supervisory oversight of a relatively new laboratory sci-
entist performing a new experiment with virulent strains. 
The first laboratory scientist also assumed that the proto-
col was appropriate for B. anthracis. It appears that there was 
incomplete communication between the two BRRAT labora-
tory scientists and the BSPB laboratory scientist about what 
was planned by the BRRAT laboratory and what had previ-
ously been done by the BSPB laboratory. The procedure used 
by the BSPB laboratory for Brucella species did not include a 
filtration step because the BSPB laboratory determined it was 
not necessary for extracts of Brucella based on the sterility 
testing they had done on extract material of three species of 
Brucella. Since B. anthracis forms spores that are more resis-
tant to inactivation by chemicals than vegetative cells, the 
BRRAT laboratory scientist’s assumption that the same treat-
ment would apply to B. anthracis was incorrect. 
The BRRAT laboratory scientist did not plan to filter ex-
tracts because it was not part of the BSPB laboratory protocol. 
The BRRAT laboratory scientist was aware that all DNA pre-
parations of B. anthracis were filtered before leaving the 
BSL-3 laboratory, but assumed that it was not necessary for 
MALDI-TOF preparations because a filtration step was not 
included in the protocol. The BRRAT laboratory scientist had 
no previous experience transferring select agent-derived ma-
terials, other than transferring DNA preparations, from BSL-3 
to BSL-2 laboratories. The BRRAT laboratory’s SOP for as-
suring sterility was specific for DNA preparations, and SOPs 
for other materials do not appear to have been in place. The 
SOP for DNA preparations (with which the first BRRAT labo-
ratory scientist was familiar) indicated that sterility check pla-
tes for B. anthracis should be held for 24-48 hours. 
It is not clear that waiting 48 hours rather than 24 hours to 
transfer the extracts would have prevented this incident. The 
bacterial cells or spores were damaged by the extraction pro-
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cedure, and the direct plating of the extract carried over che-
micals which could have inhibited growth. Acceptable practi-
ce would have been to utilize validated methods to confirm 
sterility. 
The following actions contributed to the incident: 
1.  Use of unapproved sterilization techniques: Staff in the 
BRRAT laboratory used sample preparation techniques 
for protein extraction from the manufacturer of the MAL-
DI-TOF equipment, modified by the BSPB laboratory for 
non-spore forming bacteria (Brucella species) to sterilize 
B. anthracis, a spore-forming bacterium. A laboratory sci-
entist modified the methods from the BSPB laboratory to 
include comparing filtration versus non-filtration in prepa-
ring 16 plates (half filtered and half not filtered). This mo-
dification was done to assess any effects on the MALDI-
TOF results, not to assure sterility. The incubation period 
was also shortened from 48 hours to 24 hours. 
2.  Transfer of material not confirmed to be inactive: After 
24 hours without observing growth on the sterility plates, 
the BRRAT laboratory scientist moved the extracts from 
the BRRAT laboratory BSL-3 laboratory to an adjoining 
BSL-2 laboratory, and then continued with the process of 
preparing the material for analysis by MALDI-TOF. The 
BRRAT laboratory scientist then moved the extracted ma-
terials from the BRRAT laboratory’s BSL-2 laboratory to 
the BCFB and BSPB laboratories on three separate days: 
June 6, June 11, and/or June 12, 2014. There is a lack of 
written procedures which had been validated to reliably 
ensure that organisms were no longer viable prior to remo-
ving microbiological material from BSL-3 containment. 
3.  Use of pathogenic B. anthracis when non-pathogenic 
strains would have been appropriate for this experi-
ment: The BRRAT laboratory supervisor instructed the 
laboratory scientist to use virulent strains because of the 
possibility that avirulent strains might not yield the same 
MALDI-TOF profile. However, the instrument manufac-
turer states that the system identifies bacteria to only the 
species level and would not distinguish strains of the same 
species. The use of avirulent strains to develop protocols 
would have been appropriate, particularly when conduc-
ting a pilot study. 
4. Inadequate knowledge of the peer-reviewed literature 
by the BRRAT laboratory supervisor and scientist who 
performed the extraction: A review of the literature 
would have found that filtration has been recommended 
for inactivation of B. anthracis. There are at least two peer-
reviewed publications on preparation methods for MAL-
DI-TOF work with pathogenic bacteria, including B. anth-
racis (Drevinek et al. Letters in Applied Microbiology 
2012;55:40-46; and Lasch, et al. Analytical Chemistry 
2008;80:2026-2034). While the chemicals used to process 
the samples differ in the two publications, both required 
filtration of B. anthracis material with a 0.1 micron filter 
to remove spores. Drevinek et al. (2012) concluded that 
the formic acid method (as used by the BRRAT labora-
tory) did not sterilize B. anthracis; they also used centrifu-
gal filtration to remove viable particles (including spores) 
from B. anthracis preparations. 
5.  Lack of a standard operating procedure or process to 
document inactivation in writing in the BRRAT labo-
ratory: With correct SOPs in place that are adhered to by 
staff, microbiological material would have been success-
fully inactivated prior to transfer to a lower containment 
laboratory (either intra- or inter-facility) and a record of 
non-viability would have been provided to the receiving 
laboratory; also, a written record of non-viability would 
have been provided prior to receipt and utilization of the 
microbiological materials in the BSL-2 laboratories. 
Response-related Findings 
On June 13, 2014, two CDC staff members went to the emer-
gency department at Emory University where they were as-
sessed; neither presented with symptoms related to anthrax. 
Staff were assessed based on their risk of potential exposure 
that could lead to inhalational anthrax. The number of poten-
tially exposed staff evolved as understanding of the laboratory 
events unfolded. Additional potentially exposed individuals 
were identified through supervisor discussions with individu-
als believed to have handled or been in proximity to the B. 
anthracis material. The process of identification was slowed 
by multiple factors, including the evolving nature of unders-
tanding of the event. Technology 10 resources such as card 
key readers and security video were utilized to expand the 
pool of potential exposures, but this was not an immediate 
step in the response. Even with the use of available data, seve-
ral factors made the identification process difficult, including 
the practice of authorized staff piggy backing (obtaining en-
trance to a secured area by following a colleague rather than 
by having all individuals swipe their own card key as should 
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be done) and incomplete or inaccurate information collected 
from laboratory scientists reporting their path of travel with 
the material between labs. Protocols were not in place for the 
rapid identification of potentially exposed staff, possibly de-
laying the use of available data sources including card key 
readers, visitor logs, and security video logs. 
Immediate and comprehensive actions were taken to 
identify the potentially affected laboratory rooms as well as 
the individuals that were or may have been in, or traveled 
through, these areas during the time period of possible expo-
sure. After ascertaining the precise events that took place in 
the laboratories and characterizing people’s possible exposu-
re was difficult and evolving, there were serious reservations 
on the part of some staff members of the affected laboratories 
and others about broad communication until sufficient infor-
mation was gathered and verified. In retrospect, it is clear that 
broad communications should have occurred earlier in the 
process, even if more complete information was not yet avai-
lable. CDC scientists who worked near the impacted labora-
tories commented that they first learned of the event by wit-
nessing CDC closing and/or decontaminating laboratories 
rather than through direct communication regarding the on-
going event. In addition, there were inconsistencies in the 
decontamination practices used after the incident, which 
made it difficult to ensure proper methods were used. Indivi-
duals also reported the CDC clinic was overwhelmed at times 
during the response. 
The nature of this incident required involvement of many 
parties from across CDC. While the roles of the responders 
were generally clear and appropriate actions were taken, there 
was no clear overall lead for the incident in the first week. 
This resulted in uncertainty regarding who was responsible 
for making decisions and taking action. 
As of July 10, 2014, no staff members are believed to have 
become ill with anthrax. 
Actions Already Underway and 
Plans for the Future 
A moratorium was initiated July 11, 2014, on any biological 
material leaving any CDC BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratory in or-
der to allow sufficient time to put adequate improvement me-
asures in place. In addition, CDC has already begun steps to 
protect staff and prevent similar incidents in the future. Key 
actions are planned to address the root causes of this incident. 
The recommendations focus on specific actions that provide 
redundant safeguards across the agency. 
These actions and recommendations relate to 
• The BRRAT laboratory 
• Inactivation and transfer procedures of virulent patho-
gens throughout CDC laboratories 
• Broader improvements in biosafety in laboratories 
throughout CDC 
• CDC response to internal incidents 
• Broader implications for the use of select agents, inclu-
ding for CDC’s regulatory functions through CDC’s Divi-
sion of Select Agents and Toxins. 
The BRRAT Laboratory
 
1. The laboratory has been closed since June 16, 2014, and 
will remain closed as it relates to work with any select 
agent. This action was reinforced by USDA’s Animal and 
Plant Health Inspection Services (APHIS). Laboratory 
scientists do not have access to select agents, which have 
been placed in storage-only mode. The unit will remain 
closed with respect to select agents until the following is 
completed: 
a.  An assessment and appropriate follow-up actions for 
all BRRAT laboratory staff to determine level of skills, 
training, supervision, knowledge, and expertise at all 
levels of the organization 
b.  The establishment of clear, proven procedures that 
have been communicated to all staff for inactivation 
and non-viability testing of all types of materials that 
may be produced by the laboratories (i.e., not limited 
to nucleic acid preparations from one specific labora-
tory) and documentation of these processes 
c.  Resolution of all findings included in this report and in 
the APHIS investigation report 
2. Appropriate personnel action will be taken with respect to 
individuals who contributed to or were in a position to 
prevent this incident. 
Inactivation and Transfer Procedures of Viru-
lent Pathogens throughout CDC Laboratories
 
3. All inactivation procedures for laboratories working with 
select agents and other dangerous pathogens are being ca-
refully reviewed and will be updated as needed. This in-
cludes, but is not limited to, any inactivation performed in 
conjunction with MALDI-TOF testing. CDC will notify 
the MALDI-TOF manufacturer and the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) of this event and encourage the de-
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velopment of informational materials that are clearer re-
garding appropriate inactivation procedures for all types 
of pathogens. All CDC laboratories that handle select 
agents and other dangerous pathogens will be confirmed 
to have written, validated, and verified procedures to assu-
re materials are non-viable before being removed from 
containment and to assure the provision of written docu-
mentation of non-viability, including the method used, for 
intra- and inter-facility transfers. These procedures will 
include requirements that all transferring laboratories con-
firm non-viability by proven, effective methods before 
material leaves the containment laboratory and provide 
documentation to accompany the transfer and that the re-
ceiving laboratory confirm the materials are not viable. 
When new procedures, techniques, or manufacturer met-
hods are being considered, they must first be reviewed and 
evaluated through a formal process to assess their risk and 
incorporate them into standard CDC policies, procedures, 
and practices prior to implementation. 
Laboratories across CDC
 
4. CDC will establish a lead laboratory science position to be 
the CDC-wide single point of accountability for labora-
tory safety. The creation of a single point of accountability 
does not reduce the responsibility of people at every level 
of the organization, including center, division, and branch 
directors, chiefs, supervisors, and all laboratory scientists 
to strengthen the culture of safety. This position will: 
a.  Establish and enforce agency-wide policies that requi-
re formal review and approval of new select agent re-
search or program protocols and provide oversight for 
ongoing research and program projects (e.g., yearly 
reviews). 
b.  Create effective and redundant systems and controls 
for protocols and procedures including, but not limited 
to, inactivation and access to laboratories (e.g., “pig-
gybacking” and visitor access). 
c.  Ensure adherence to laboratory quality and safety pro-
tocols (e.g., quality assurance that biological material 
is non-viable before it is shipped from CDC select 
agent laboratories). These protocols will be transferred 
to new staff whenever there is a turnover in select 
agent laboratories, especially when there is a new prin-
cipal investigator. 
d.  Review and monitor the implementation of training 
policies and procedures for new and existing staff. 
5. Use an approach that identifies the points in any project whe-
re potential mistakes would have the most serious conse-
quences that provides specific actions to avoid these mista-
kes. Examples of these critical points and associated pre-
ventive actions include requiring protocols to be reviewed 
by supervisors before they are implemented, having stan-
dard and clear procedures to inactivate infectious agents 
and specify how they will be transferred to other labs, ha-
ving formal incident response plans in place, controlling 
laboratory access, and instituting regular review of labora-
tory processes to ensure proper safety, quality management, 
and compliances with Select Agent Regulations. 
a.  Identify ways to decrease the risk of an event such as 
this happening again, which may include fewer labora-
tories working with select agents and/or a decrease in 
the number of pathogenic strains being studied and/or 
a decrease in the number of staff members working 
with these agents. 
b.  Promote the use of non-pathogenic organisms in rese-
arch and training activities, whenever possible. 
c.  Accelerate the ongoing implementation of laboratory 
quality management systems (QMS) throughout CDC 
laboratories. Over the past 5 years, CDC has begun 
implementing a QMS for infectious disease laboratori-
es which includes document controls such as protocol 
archives and approval records as an integral part. Initi-
al adoption of QMS has focused on the laboratories 
with clinical diagnostic responsibilities and has greatly 
enhanced their safety and efficiency. Expansion into 
nonclinical laboratories has been ongoing and will 
now be accelerated as a high priority, with QMS beco-
ming an integral part of CDC laboratory management 
practice. 
6. CDC will establish an external advisory committee to pro-
vide ongoing advice and direction for laboratory quality 
and safety. It is likely this advisory committee will be es-
tablished under the Federal Advisory Committee Act 
(FACA). 
Response Efforts 
7. CDC will initiate an incident command structure early in 
any response to an incident at CDC when an event is sus-
pected that the incident is significant or not well unders-
tood. CDC may also leverage the assets of CDC’s Emer-
gency Operations Center to help coordinate the event res-
ponse under the incident commander. This does not neces-
sarily mean activating the EOC for such a purpose, but use 
of the EOC facility, staff, tools, and other resources as 
well as coordination within CDC offices could be benefi-
cial. Under this structure, CDC can ensure proactive and 
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frequent communication with staff, media, and the public. 
This structure will also allow for quick access to CDC 
staff with unique expertise to provide surge capacity (in-
cluding nurses and physicians to staff the CDC clinic), as 
needed.
Broader Implications for the Use of Select 
Agents
 
8. Lessons based on this incident that will be considered for 
broader implications. CDC’s DSAT program will incorpo-
rate findings and recommendations into nationwide regu-
latory activities to provide stronger safeguards for labora-
tories across the United States. For example, in its review 
of biosafety plans with regulated entities, DSAT will em-
phasize the importance of having proven inactivation pro-
tocols and utilizing testing for inactivated preparations 
prior to distribution. 
Conclusion 
Potential exposure of CDC laboratory scientists to anthrax oc-
curred as a result of a series of failures of one laboratory (the 
CDC BRRAT laboratory) to ensure that B. anthracis speci-
mens had been inactivated before transferring them to other 
laboratories at CDC. This same laboratory had inadvertently 
transferred viable B. anthracis on a previous occasion in 
2006. Review of the procedures and practices that allowed 
this event to occur identified: failures of policy, training, sci-
entific knowledge, supervision, and judgment on the part of 
this laboratory. In addition, there was a lack of adequate 
agency-wide policies and procedures to ensure biosafety, both 
for decontamination of select agents and other virulent orga-
nisms as well as for biosafety more broadly. Further, biosafety 
policies and procedures adopted in the past were not always 
adhered to in the present. Response to the incident should 
have been better organized from the outset. 
Review of the incident suggests that it is highly unlikely, 
but not impossible, that staff members were exposed to viable 
B. anthracis. None of the potentially exposed workers has be-
come ill with anthrax. Nonetheless, this was a serious and unac-
ceptable incident which should never have happened. A mora-
torium is being put into effect on July 11, 2014, on any biologi-
cal material leaving any CDC BSL-3 or BSL-4 laboratory in 
order to allow sufficient time to put adequate improvement 
measures in place. Five key steps are being taken immediately: 
suspension of activities of this individual laboratory pending 
full review and remediation of all procedures and practices; 
agency-wide verification of adequate inactivation procedures; 
strengthening of biosafety agency-wide with appointment of a 
single point of accountability and through an external group of 
experts to review and advise CDC; improvement of manage-
ment of internal incidents with use of an incident management 
system; and use of lessons learned from this incident to strengt-
hen CDC’s regulatory function with regard to select agents. 
Given both the critical nature of investigations to enable 
CDC to improve our ability to detect and respond to naturally 
occurring and man-made events with select agents and the 
paramount responsibility of ensuring the safety of CDC staff 
members when they do this work, CDC leadership, including 
the CDC Director, will track the rapid and effective imple-
mentation of these plans.
